Financing real estate development through rated commercial paper : an analysis of 75 State Street by Lietz, Cordell A
FINANCING REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH RATED COMMERCIAL PAPER:
AN ANALYSIS OF 75 STATE STREET
by
CORDELL A. LIETZ
Bachelor of Science; Architectural Studies
Arizona State University
(1981)
Submitted to the Department of Architecture
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science in
Real Estate Development
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
July 1989
Cordell A. Lietz 1989
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Cordell Lietz
Department of chitecture
ulv 21. 1989
Certified by
James McIellar
Visiting Professor
Department of Architecture
Director of the Center For Real Estate Development
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by
Michael Wheeler
Chairman
Interdepartmental Degree Program in Real Estate Development
-1-
(SEP 2519)
FREWRI
FINANCING REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH RATED COMMERCIAL PAPER:
AN ANALYSIS OF 75 STATE STREET
by
CORDELL A. LIETZ
Submitted to the Department of Architecture
on July 31, 1989 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Science in Real Estate Development
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the changes that have taken place in the
real estate capital markets over the past decade, and the new
breed of financing instruments that have emerged. The paper
focuses on the securitization of to-be-developed properties,
and more specifically, the issuance of rated, commercial
paper, for construction and permanent financing. As a model
for the analysis , a case study of the 75 State Street
development in Boston, Massachusetts is presented. This
development represents the first time commercial paper was
issued on a to-be-built office building, with no pre-leasing,
using interest rate swaps to fix the rate.
In analyzing the success of the commercial paper program
used on 75 State Street, the evolution of the real estate
capital markets is set forth, as are the new financing
instruments that emerged under the new capital market
structure. The paper attempts to explain why securitization
has not been used more frequently on to-be-developed
properties and discusses the future of commercial paper
programs in real estate development.
Thesis Supervisor: James McKellar
Title: Visiting Professor, Department of
Architecture; Director of The Center For
Real Estate Development.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, real estate capital markets have undergone
dramatic changes. As part of these changes, we have seen a
significant shift in the distribution of risks and rewards in
real estate, between those parties that had traditionally
supplied equity capital and those institutions that had
traditionally supplied debt.
The financial volatility that occurred at the beginning of the
1980's caused a new capital market structure to emerge. This
structure has produced a new breed of real estate financing
vehicles that include; Institutional Partnerships,
Participating-Type Mortgages, Accrual Mortgages, and the
Securitization of real estate.
Securitization epitomizes the move away from the traditional
capital market structure and represents the continuing
integration of Wall Street into the real estate industry.
However, once touted as the wave of the future, securitization
has not lived up to many people's expectations. This is
especially true with the securitization of to-be-developed
properties.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the securitization of
to-be-developed properties and, more specifically, the
issuance of commercial paper for construction and permanent
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financing. As a model for this analysis, the paper focuses on
a case study of the 75 State Street development in Boston,
Massachusetts. This development represents the first time
commercial paper was issued on a to-be-built office building,
with no pre-leasing, using interest rate swaps to fix the
rate.
Chapter II presents the case study of 75 State Street and
provides a brief history as to the origin of this development.
The case study outlines the objectives that the developers
established prior to obtaining financing and the commercial
paper program that was ultimately used.
Chapter III examines the evolution in the real estate capital
markets that has occurred during the past decade. It
attributes the reason for the evolution to the ERISA pension
legislation established in 1974, and to the financial
volatility that has occurred in the 1980's. This volatility
was caused by the change in monetary policy in 1979, and the
deregulation of banks and thrifts under the new Reagan
administration.
Chapter IV looks at the new breed of financing instruments
that evolved under the new capital market structure. It
analyzes the alternatives that were available to the
developers of 75 State Street and offers examples using these
alternate financing vehicles in Appendix A and B.
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Chapter V examines the use of securitization of
to-be-developed properties. It outlines the reasons why the
commercial paper program was successful on 75 State Street and
why securitization has not been used more frequently. In
conclusion, the paper discusses what the future holds for
securitization as a financing vehicle for to-be-developed
properties.
Limitations
This paper is not intended to provide a complete history of
the real estate capital markets or the various financing
instruments that are available. Nor is it intended to provide
a thorough analysis of all securitization programs and their
uses. Rather, the intent is to provide a specific case study,
of a to-be-developed property, that employed securitization as
a financing vehicle and then analyze the effectiveness of
the solution, given the state of the capital markets at the
time and the alternatives that were available. In doing so,
it attempts to explain the past successes and future dilemmas
of using securitization to finance to-be-developed properties.
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CHAPTER II.
CASE STUDY: 75 STATE STREET
The financing for 75 State Street is one of the most complex
transactions ever done on a to-be-developed property and was
named one of the "most innovative financings in 1987" by
Pension and Investment Age. (1) The $287 million dollar
financing, involved a floating commercial paper issue, which
was securitized by third party credit enhancement, with
interest rate swaps to fix the rate. Various other interim
hedging devices were also used. All of these elements had
never before been combined to finance a to-be-built office
building with zero pre-leasing. (2)
The 31 story office building, located in Boston's financial
district, was developed by a limited partnership which
included The Beacon Companies and Equitable Real Estate
Investment Management Inc. as the general partners, each
owning approximately 40%. A small group of limited partners,
including the original landowner and the architect, own the
remaining 20%. Beacon and Equitable shared all of the
pre-development costs and all of the risks equally.
Construction on the 750,000 square foot development, which
includes a 700 car parking garage below grade, began in
mid-1986 and was completed in early 1989.
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The Players
The origin of 75 State Street dates back to 1983 when the City
of Boston, under the direction of Mayor Kevin White, wanted to
sell several key parking garages to private entities. One of
these properties, which they solicited a Request For Proposal
(RFP) on, was the Kilby Street garage, which stood on a
portion of the property now occupied by 75 State Street.
Through the RFP process, the garage was acquired by Harold
Brown, a prominent Boston landowner. Brown owned property
adjacent to the Kilby Street garage and proposed that the
properties be joined in order to develop a first class office
building.
To give his proposal credibility, Brown solicited Equitable
Real Estate Investment Management Inc. (herein referred to
Equitable) who are the independent real estate subsidiary of
Equitable Life Insurance Co. Equitable Real Estate is
currently the third largest holder of U.S. real estate with
over $13 billion in equities. They are also the second
largest pension fund advisor, currently advising more than
$8.3 billion in assets. (3) Equitable initially intended to
only be the financial entity. They were brought in to give
Brown the credibility he needed to get through the demanding
regulatory process that exists in Boston.
In 1983, Brown, along with Equitable and architect Graham
Gund, were tentatively designated by the Boston Redevelopment
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Authority (BRA) as the development team for the property.
However, shortly thereafter several events occurred which
altered the development plan. The first event was the new
administration which replaced White in 1984. Under the new
mayor, Raymond Flynn, the BRA took a dramatic change of
course. The plan for 75 State Street that had received
tentative approval was not looked favorably upon by the new
administration.
Furthermore, Equitable was not convinced that Brown possessed
the necessary expertise to develop a downtown office building.
As the financial entity, they were pressuring him to find a
partner with more experience. Brown finally decided he wanted
out of the deal altogether.
In order to save the deal, Equitable approached The Beacon
Companies to join them as co-developer. The Beacon Companies
are a privately held real estate concern, developing both
commercial and residential real estate. They are based in
Boston but have substantial experience throughout the Eastern
United States. The Beacon Companies are closely run by the
Leventhal family who established the business in 1946 as a
Boston construction company. Over the years, Beacon has
developed several downtown office buildings and are familiar
with the Boston development process.
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Equitable was most concerned with the regulatory risks and
getting re-designated by the BRA with a new developer. Based
on Beacon's experience in downtown Boston, and prior
associations that Equitable has had with them, they believed
Beacon would be able to get them through the zoning process.
Under the new arrangement, Equitable was no longer a financial
entity but became co-developers with Beacon. Brown and Graham
Gund remained in the new partnership but only as limited
partners, with no control over the project.
Equitable believed that the new arrangement significantly
reduced the risks they were facing at the time. Beacon would
lend development experience to the partnership which would
help them weave through the regulatory maze that exists in
Boston. They would also contribute their design and
construction experience in the redesign of the project. As a
general partner, with 40% the capital contribution and upside
potential, they had the incentive to develop a profitable
project. Equitable saw their move from being just a financial
entity to co-developer, as further mitigating their risk. As
a general partner they potentially had more liability but they
also had more control over the development. It also enabled
Equitable to obtain more experience in Boston development for
future projects they may want to develop themselves. The move
from a debt position to an equity position reduced their
financial exposure. The majority of the development cost
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would now be funded by a third party source. Equitable did
not want to depend on their parent company for financing this
venture.
In 1985, Beacon and Equitable were designated by the BRA as
co-developers for 75 State Street. They borrowed
approximately $80 million to acquire the existing buildings
from Brown and the garage from the City of Boston. The loan
was non-recourse to the two companies and involved no
cross-collateralization. It was secured by the existing
structures only..
The Financing Objectives
The financing for 75 State Street evolved out of a list of
objectives that were established by Beacon and Equitable. The
objectives were essentially a "wish list" that any developer
would desire to have for their project financing. These
objectives are outlined below.
1) 100% Financing. The developers wanted to finance
$287 million, which was the total project cost
including reserves for operating deficits during the
lease-up period, and the actual leasing costs
(tenant improvements and free rent). This amount
also included the repayment of the existing $80
million loan that the developers took out for the
initial land acquisition.
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2) Fixed Rate Financing. Interest rates were favorable
at the time and they did not want to risk the chance
of an adverse move. They wanted to obtain fixed
rate financing for both the construction loan and
the permanent loan.
3) No Further Participation. With the two
co-developers already giving 20% of the project to
the limited partners, they did not want to give
anymore away to a lender. Essentially they wanted
to obtain the maximum amount of leverage possible.
4) 10 To 12-Year Term. The rates for ten-year money
were favorable at the time, vis-a-vis the project's
proforma, and the developers wanted to lock them in
for long term financing. (10-year Treasuries were
approximately 9% in early 1986). Financing for a
term longer than twelve years was not readily
available and would involve significant
participation on behalf of the lender.
5) Limit Personal and Corporate Guarantees. Although
the project was highly speculative, they wanted it
to stand on its own. Beacon, being a family owned
business, did not want to give personal guarantees
to obtain financing. Equitable Real Estate wanted
to act as a co-developer and not be dependent on the
credit of their parent company. If they had to use
the parent company for credit enhancement, it would
have cost them 1% of the principal amount.
-12-
6) Right To Pre-Pay. Although the partnership wanted
long term financing, they also wanted the
flexibility to pre-pay the money at any time with
little or no penalty. This would give them a
maximum amount of flexibility to sell the property
or refinance it once it was fully leased and
seasoned.
7) Lowest Cost. Even though the developers wanted
to meet all of their objectives, there was an
obvious limit on what they were willing to pay for
these advantages.
The Financing
The partners considered traditional financing alternatives but
realized that none of these alternatives were going to meet
all of their key objectives. Ten-year, fixed-rate, bullet
loans were not available for an unleased, to-be-built office
building. The partners did not want to do a below market
lease with an anchor tenant just so they could obtain
financing. Going open ended on a construction loan would
require substantial guarantees from the partners. A closed
ended construction loan requires a forward take-out
commitment, but to get such a commitment would require a
participating and/or convertible mortgage to a pension fund.
This would seriously dilute the partners equity position.
Furthermore, the participating mortgage would carry severe
pre-payment penalties.
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After a brainstorming session over the above set of objectives
with the investment banking firm of Goldman Sachs & Co., the
partners decided to try to apply certain corporate financing
techniques to real estate. The elements of the successful
financing are outlined below.
Commercial Paper Program
To raise the $287 million in funds, the partnership issued
floating rate commercial paper. In order to sell commercial
paper carrying the lowest interest rate possible, the paper
had to carry an investment grade rating from both S&P and
Moody's. There was no pre-leasing on the project, so by
itself, the development would never get the required ratings.
Therefore, the partnership needed a third party with an
investment grade rating to guarantee the project. Citicorp,
who has the highest rating of all the U.S. banks, was
retained for the credit enhancement. Citicorp posted a letter
of credit in the amount of $287 million to guarantee the
issuance and then acted as the commercial paper dealer. The
letter of credit guarantees the paper for a ten year term.
Interest Rate Swaps
The commercial paper was issued approximately every 90 days to
approximate the construction draw schedule. Once the full
amount was issued it will float for a ten year period.
Citicorp continues to be the dealer, constantly revolving and
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re-issueing the paper. Since the interest rate for the
commercial paper program is floating and the developers
desired fixed-rate financing, they entered into a series of
interest rate swaps to fix the rate. Eight forward
serial-swaps had to be established since the commercial paper
was not being issued all at once. The swaps were set up to
match the construction draw schedule and the issuence of the
commercial paper. Although Citibank could have provided the
forward swap commitments, the partnership decided to let
Goldman Sachs find the swap conuterparties to avoid
monopolistic pricing. Goldman solicited bids from
counterparties for the eight forward swap commitments and, in
fact, Citibank was awarded three of the eight swaps. The
interest rate swaps that were entered into are listed in
Exhibit 2.1, 75 State Street Interest Rate Swaps.
One of the risks inherent in the transaction is that the swap
commitments are based on the Federal Funds 30-day Composite
Index, while the obligation for the actual payments is based
on Citicorp's rating. Although the spread between the
30-day composite and Citicorp's commercial paper is
currently slight, any downgrading or inherent rumors in
Citicorp's rating would increase this spread significantly.
Given the amount of sovereign debt held by Citibank and
currently outstanding, this possibility is not remote.
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75 STATE ST.
Interest-Rate Swaps
Ultimate
Counterparty
P1111 Group, Inc.
UBS Securities
(Union Bank ofr
Switzerland
affiliate)
Citibank, N.A.
Citibank, N.A.
Citibank, N.A.
Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co.
KDCF (Kleinwort
Benson Cross Financi
KBCF
Amount
(millions)
$100
$25
Start End
Date Date
1/5/87
9/15/87
1/1/97
12/15/96
Annual
Fixed
Rate
8.15%
8.451%
Fixed
Rate
Pay
Dates
3/1 & 9/1
6/15 & 12/15
$25 12/15/87 12/15/96 8.542% 6/15 & 12/15
$25
$25
$25
$25
ng)
$36.5
$286.5
3/15/88 12/15/96 8.632% 6/15 & 12/15
6/15/88 12/15/96 8.722% 6/15 & 12/15
12/15/88 1/15/97 8.727% 15th of each
month
3/15/89 12/15/96 8.97% 6/15 & 12/15
6/15/89 12/15/96 9.56% 6/15 & 12/15
Floating Rate
(N.Y.F.R.B
H-15 Composite
1-mo. C.P. Rate)
Receipt Date
(in arrears)
1st of each month
15th of each month
Floating Rate
Set Date
1st day of each period.
Avg. rate during each
period.
15th of each month
15th
15th
15th
of
of
of'
each
each
each
month
month
month
15th of each month
15th of each month
1st day of each period.
Note: If any Pay Date, Receipt Date or 1-mo. C.P. Rate Setting Date falls on a weekend or holiday it will become
the next business day.
Ha
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The combined eight swaps gave the development a fixed rate
payment of slightly more than 9.5% for a ten year period. The
developers obligations under the swap contract are as follows;
1) Pay the Federal Reserve Bank's 30-day composite for
commercial paper, 2) Cover the spread between the composite
index and Citicorp's commercial paper (currently ranging
from 0 to 10 basis points), 3) Pay the commercial paper
dealer's fee (ranges between 10 and 12 basis points), and 4)
Pay the issuers fee for the letter of credit (which was
approximately 100 basis points but can range anywhere from
50-200 basis points).
Additional Hedges
One of the inherent problems with securitization as a
financing vehicle is the time involved. It took approximately
11 months to close the transaction from the time Beacon and
Equitable started working on it. While they were working out
the financing, interest rates were falling dramatically
throughout the year (1986). To protect themselves from a
change in this trend, the developers bought "put" options on
10-year Treasuries early in the process. They chose options
instead of futures, because although they wanted to protect
themselves from a rise in interest rates, they believed that
rates would continue to fall and wanted to benefit from this
trend.
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The 120 day option was for 10-year Treasuries at 8%, which was
50 basis points out of the money. The premium paid for an
amount equal to their principal amount was $5.5 million.
Interest rates continued to fall and the developers let the
option expire. However, several months later, the developers
locked in their rate by selling short $280 million of 10-year
Treasuries, which at the time were in the low 7% range. The
cost of the short sale was 10 basis points.
Summary
The financing for 75 State Street met all of the partner's
objectives, giving them 10-year financing fixed at
approximately 9.5%. This financing gives the partnership
maximum flexibility. They can unwind the commercial paper
program at any time, simply by not re-issueing the paper when
the roll over occurs. For this reason, any downgrading in
Citicorp's rating does not have a significant adverse impact.
The developers could simply switch to conventional financing
or find another party to support the commercial paper. The
interest rate swaps can also be unwound by marking them to
market and paying the difference between the current and
future value (if any). Conversely, the swaps can be left in
place and applied to the new financing or another financing.
The credit enhancement can also be replaced if a less
expensive guarantee can be found.
-18-
A LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) based loan with
interest rate swaps would have given the developers similar
flexibility and would have eliminated the differential between
the 30-day composite index and Citicorp's rated commercial
paper. However, even with this spread eliminated, the
developers found that LIBOR based financing, at the time,
would have been 25 basis points more expensive. On the $287
million financing, the 25 basis points equated to more than
$700,000 per year in extra finance costs.
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CHAPTER III.
THE REAL ESTATE CAPITAL MARKET
To analyze the financing of 75 State Street and the
effectiveness of securitizing to-be-developed properties, it
is necessary to set forth the evolution that has occurred in
the real estate capital markets. Exhibit 3.1 depicts a model
of the traditional real estate capital market established by
John McMahan Associates. This model shows a clear distinction
between the sources of debt and equity.
Exhibit 3.1
Traditional Real Estate Capital Market
Thrift
Passbook
BankMorag
Life Policy insurance
Attorney Developer
InvestorsLi ted EquitiesPartnrsip
tnerh DAccountant 
Broker
Private Syndicator
Capital Instrument Capital Investment InvestmentSource Intermediary Intermediary
Source; John McMahan Associates Inc.
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In the traditional capital market there were three distinct
parties who ultimately invested in a real estate development.
Commercial banks invested in the form of short term debt,
insurance companies invested through long term debt, and the
development partnership retained all of the equity.
Traditional financing, for to-be-developed properties,
revolved around a forward take-out commitment from an
institution, typically the life insurance company. The
take-out was essentially a commitment by the life company to
fund a long-term loan once the property reached a stabilized
occupancy. This loan was usually self-amortizing with a fixed
interest rate for a 25-30 year term. With the commitment in
hand, the developer could then get 100% financing from a
commercial bank for the short-term construction loan.
Prior to the 1980's, the traditional model of the real estate
capital market was extremely efficient and represented little
risk to the parties involved. The life insurance companies
mitigated their risk by not funding until the building reached
a stabilized occupancy. At that point, it was a safer
investment. The uncertainties of a new development were
removed and the building could produce a steady stream of cash
flows to service the debt.
For the construction lender it was also a relatively safe
investment. Real interest rates at the time were stable and
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markets were not overbuilt, so the construction and
lease-up period could be accurately forecasted. Having the
take-out commitment from the life company gave the
construction lender an assurance that the money would be there
to take them out of the development once it was fully leased.
Traditionally, the construction lender would only be in the
deal for a two to three year period, depending on the size of
the development.
However, in the past decade there have been several major
events that have occurred in the United States which have
dramatically altered the capital market for real estate and
the traditional forms of financing.
The first of these events actually occurred more than a decade
ago, but the effects of it on the real estate industry were
not felt until recently. In 1974, major pension legislation,
commonly known as ERISA (Employee Retirement Investment
Security Act), was enacted. For the first time, ERISA
established minimum amounts that employers had to set aside
for pensions of future retirees. The effect of this
legislation created an unprecedented supply of new investment
dollars in pension funds. (1) In an effort to diversify their
portfolios, the fund managers slowly began to invest in real
estate. Eventually, the domestic pension funds replaced the
life insurance companies as the primary investor in U.S. real
estate. (2)
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The second major event came in October of 1979, when the new
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank (Paul Volcker), started
to control the nation's money supply rather than interest
rates. This allowed the free market to set the interest
rates, and for the first time in recent history, a relatively
stable interest rate environment disappeared.
The advent of the Reagan administration compounded the problem
when they repealed Regulation Q, which had regulated the
interest rates that banks could pay on various accounts. This
deregulation of banks and thrifts freed up more money to be
invested in real estate, while giving more uncertainty to
interest rates.
These events resulted in extremely volatile nominal interest
rates and the highest real interest rates that we have
experienced in recent history. Simultaneously, the Federal
government began incurring major budget deficits and the
United States began incurring major foreign trade deficits.
(3) This caused inflation to become equally volatile. The
volatility of interest and inflation rates are shown in
Exhibit 3.2. Note the dramatic increase in the real interest
rate, which is the spread of the nominal interest rate (shown)
over the inflation rate.
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Exhibit 3.2
Financial Volatility: Prime Rate Vs. Inflation Rate
PERCENT
20.0-
17.5 -
15.0 -
12.5 -
10.0 -
7.5-
5.0-
2.5
1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Source; U.S. Bureau
Corporation.
of the Census, Real Estate Research
With the financial volatility that was occurring in the late
seventies and early eighties, individuals began purchasing
term life insurance rather than whole life. (4) As a result,
the life insurance companies could no longer count on a steady
flow of insurance premiums for the future. The uncertainty of
their only source of funds, combined with the fact that real
estate developments were becoming more costly and the
construction/lease-up periods taking more time, meant that the
life insurance companies could no longer give developers
forward commitments. (5) The primary source of funds for
-25-
permanent financing in the traditional real estate capital
market was no longer available. This forced the developers of
75 State Street and the rest of the industry to look elsewhere
for their long-term money.
The life insurance companies were replaced by the domestic
pension funds as the major source of long-term capital for
real estate. Since the ERISA pension act in 1974, the volume
of pension fund money needing to be invested has significantly
increased . In the past four years the pension funds have more
than doubled. The top 200 pension funds now control well over
one trillion dollars and the top 1000 funds control over two
trillion dollars. Although the percentage of their total
assets invested in real estate has remained relatively stable,
the total dollar amount invested in real estate has grown
dramatically. (See Exhibit 3.3; Pension Fund Asset Mix).
Exhibit 3.3
Pension Fund Asset Mix For The
1984
Asset type S Billions Percent
Stocks 264.3 41.2
Bonds 214.2 33.4
Cash 66.7 10.4
Real estate equity 2.2 3.3
Mortgages 14.1 2.2
Mortgage-backed securities 18.6 2.9
GICs 19.2 3.0
Other 23.1 3.6
Total 641.4 100.0
Top 200 Funds
1987
S Billions Percent
564.0 47.1
378.4 31.6
98.2 8.2
40.7 3.4
16.8 1.4
40.7 3.4
27.5 2.3
31.1 2.6
1,197.5 100.0
Source; Pension and Investment Age, Real Estate Research
Corporation.
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With the financial volatility that was occurring in the
capital markets, the pension funds primary concern was
protecting their principal and hedging inflation.
Historically, real estate has provided a good hedging vehicle
combined with a diversification opportunity due to it's
negative correlation to stocks, which is the primary
investment vehicle for pension funds. Exhibit 3.4 compares
the returns on real estate and the S&P 500 to inflation,
indicated by the Consumer Price Index.
Exhibit 3.4
Real Estate Pooled Fund Returns
and the S&P 500 Vs. Inflation
Pooled real estate funds S&P 500 stocks
Unrealized
Year appreciation
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Arithmetic
mean
1.3%
2.4
3.2
8.0
11.2
8.9
7.9
0.6
5.8
5.3
2.6
1.4
0.5
Income Total
return return
8.6%
8.8
8.8
9.6
9.6
9.3
8.9
8.5
8.4
8.4
7.7
7.2
6.9
9.9%
11.2
12.0
17.6
20.8
18.2
16.8
9.1
14.2
13.7
10.3
8.6
7.4
4.5 8.5 13.1
Unrealized
appreciation
28.4%
15.1
(8.4)
3.4
8.4
26.4
(8.2)
11.9
21.2
(0.3)
19.2
23.7
2.0
11.0
Income Total
return return
4.3%
3.8
4.6
5.3
5.5
5.3
5.2
5.8
4.4
4.6
4.2
3.5
3.1
32.7%
18.9
(3.8)
8.7
13.9
31.7
(3.0)
17.7
25.6
4.3
23.4
27.2
5.1
4.6 15.6 6.4
Source; Real Estate Profiles, Evaluation Profiles; Standard
& Poor's; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics; Real Estate Research Corporation.
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CPI
7.0%
4.8
6.8
9.0
13.3
12.4
8.9
3.9
3.8
4.0
3.8
1.1
4.4
The result of all the turmoil, has drastically increased the
cost of financing and the financial risk involved in new
developments. What has emerged is a new structure to the real
estate capital market. (See Exhibit 3.5; The New Real Estate
Capital Market).
Exhibit 3.5
The New Real Estate Capital Market
Passbook Thrilt
Short Term Money Market BankSavers
CD's L te
Capital Capital Investment
Source Instrument Intesmedlary Intermediary Investment
Source; John McMahan Associaties Inc.
In the new structure there has been a dramatic shift in the
distribution of risks and rewards between those parties that
had traditionally put up equity and those institutions that
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had traditionally supplied debt. (6) The life insurance
companies who had been the primary source of debt have been
out of the forward take-out business for approximately seven
years. (7) Instead they have focussed on investing in
seasoned properties or providing advisory services for pension
funds. The volatility of interest rates caused the pension
funds to drastically reduce the term of their fixed-rate loans
from thirty years, to not more than ten years, and often as
short as seven. To hedge their inflation concerns, they have
sought equity positions or equity disguised as debt in the
form of participating and/or convertible mortgages.
While the above events dramatically altered the investment
strategies of domestic investors, foreign investors were also
affecting the financing of real estate. Foreign capital
investment became essential as the United States became the
world's largest debtor nation. As a result, the domestic
capital markets are now constantly affected by the level of
interest rates, currency exchange rates, and the stock markets
in Europe and Japan. (8)
As lenders adjusted their investment strategies, it forced
developers to adjust theirs also. What evolved under the new
capital market structure is a mixture of debt and equity
instruments such as development partnerships, fee development,
participating-type mortgages and securitization. Gone is the
traditional form of financing, with the developer owning 100%
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of the project with a long term mortgage for 100% of the
project's costs.
Developers have become much more risk adverse than they were
under the traditional capital structure of ten years ago.
They are more willing to surrender some of the upside
potential in order to spread the downside risks on to other
parties. The pension funds are willing to assume some of
these risks earlier in the development process in order to
boost their returns. The financing alternatives that have
emerged, allow the institution to enter a real estate
investment anywhere along the risk spectrum. They also allow
a developer to assess their risk preferences, and assign those
risks that they are not willing to take on to other parties.
The new capital structure allows greater efficiency in our
high interest rate environment, enabling investors to better
balance the risks and rewards in light of their risk
profiles. The result is a new level of sophistication in
real estate finance, as developers become more risk adverse
and the lending institutions become more involved in the
development process. The financing tools being used today
reflect an increasing comfort with the capital markets on
behalf of the developer, and an increasing knowledge of real
estate on behalf of Wall Street. These forces all played an
integral part in the decision process, and the ultimate
financing, for 75 State Street.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE NEW FINANCIAL STRUCTURES
In order to analyze the complex financial structure that was
put in place for 75 State Street, it is necessary to
understand the financing alternatives that were available to
them. The developers for 75 State Street explored several
different alternatives, all of them being relatively new
instruments that had emerged from the new capital market
structure. These included development partnerships,
participating and/or convertible mortgages, accrual mortgages,
or floating rate instruments combined with an interest rate
cap. The developers weighed each of these alternatives
against their financing objectives and the risks they were
willing to assume.
Development partnerships between pension funds and developers
are currently the most popular way to shift the risks and
rewards among the different parties. (1) New England Mutual
Life is considered to be the pioneer in development joint
ventures. The concept was first used by them in 1966, however
it did not take off until they separated their real estate
program and formed Copley Real Estate Advisors in 1982.
Today, Copley is considered the leader in institutional joint
ventures, which is still a relatively new concept for most
pension funds.
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Pension funds traditionally shyed away from to-be-developed
equity investments due to the high degree of risk. However in
the past few years, pension funds have increasingly entered
the development process earlier on, in an effort to boost
their returns and hedge inflation. Their desire has been
welcomed by the development community. With fixed-rate,
forward commitments no longer available, developers have to go
open ended on their construction loans. With softening
markets and rising interest rates, combined with the
increasing costs of development and the length of time
involved, many developers are forced to find joint venture
partners that are well capitalized and willing to share the
risks involved.
The developers of 75 State Street explored a partnership
arrangement with both domestic and foreign pension funds. One
of the problems encountered was the speculative nature of the
development. With no pre-leasing in place, there was
essentially no pension fund willing to contribute $287 million
in equity. A development partnership would have required at
least 20% equity contribution ($57 million) on behalf of
Beacon and Equitable, and a preferred return to the pension
fund in the order of 9-10%. Furthermore, the equity position
of the original partner's interests would be seriously
diluted, by a magnitude of approximately one-half.
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Participating and/or convertible mortgages presented a similar
problem for the developers. The participating mortgage is
currently the most widely used debt instrument for
to-be-developed projects. (2) The instrument is essentially
equity disguised as debt because the lender participates in
the project's cash flows. In this respect it is very similar
to development partnerships. The developers would have to
contribute a minimum of 20% equity and pay a preferred return
in the form of the coupon rate on the note. Under the
participating structure, they would see their equity position
diluted by promising half of the cash flows to the lender.
Under the convertible structure, half of the back end of the
deal would also go to the lender. A further analysis of
participating-type mortgages and an example of a current
financing using these structures is given in Appendix A.
Another debt instrument that has evolved out of the new real
estate capital market is the accrual mortgage. This is
essentially a fixed-rate instrument that has a lower pay rate
in the early years. The difference in the pay rate and coupon
rate accrues and is paid at maturity. The accrual mortgage
was designed to give developers a lower debt service in the
early years before the property stabilizes but give the lender
a higher coupon rate overall from the back end of the
development. In this way, the accrual mortgage more closely
matches the project's cash flows than traditional fixed-rate
mortgages did. Although the accrual mortgage generally gives
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a developer a higher loan amount than conventional financing,
it is usually lower than what a participating-type structure
provides. Therefore, 100% financing would not be available
under this alternative. Due to the lack of pre-leasing, the
accrual mortgage would require personal and/or corporate
guarantees as well, something that Beacon and Equitable wanted
to avoid. Appendix B outlines the terms of a current
financing using an accrual mortgage in comparison to
conventional financing.
The developers of 75 State Street also explored going with a
floating rate loan and then fixing the rate with an interest
rate cap. Although they would have had to post guarantees,
this scenario would have yielded the 100% financing they
desired. However, interest rate caps had limited availability
for more than a seven year term. Caps that were available for
a longer period were 400 to 500 basis points above the
prevailing interest rate. This did not provide much
protection in lieu of the volatile interest rates of the past
five years. Even at this level, the cap would cost between 50
and 70 basis points of the principal amount.
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CHAPTER V.
SECURITIZATION
The securitization program that was used to finance 75 State
Street epitomizes the departure from the traditional real
estate capital market and the continuing integration of Wall
Street into the real estate industry. Securities for
commercial real estate are a relatively recent phenomena,
first emerging in late 1983. (1) They evolved out of the
residential mortgage market and first appeared as commercial
mortgage securities. These took several forms such as Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REIT's), Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduit's (REMIC's), and Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations (CMO's). All of these investment vehicles
involved seasoned properties bundled together. This offered
the investor less risk through secured income streams and
geographical diversification.
In the past four years, the annual volume for commercial real
estate securities ranged from $10 billion to a high of $19.7
billion in 1985. However, these volumes are miniscule
compared to the total amount of commercial debt in the U.S.,
now estimated to exceed $1 trillion, and commercial real
estate equity now estimated to exceed $2.2 trillion. (2)
The securitization of to-be-developed properties has been
much slower to develop. The commercial paper program that was
used to finance 75 State Street was highly successful in
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meeting all of the developers objectives and marked the first
time securitization was used on an unleased, to-be-built
office building. (3) When the transaction first occurred,
many people in the industry believed securitization to be the
future of the development industry. This belief was
reinforced by the securitization of the 1201 Third Avenue
development in Seattle Washington, which occurred shortly
after 75 State Street.
Wall Street continues to tout securitization as the wave of
the future, as they recognize the huge untapped potential of
securitizing commercial real estate and the fees that are
associated with it. However, to determine the future of
securitization, it is necessary to understand why it was
successful in the past, and the advantages and disadvantages
of using it in the future.
The success of securitization programs depend on the perceived
risk of the investment by the capital markets. For this
reason, investors in real estate securities will always
compare the risk of the investment (determined by the credit
rating) to the risk free investment of U.S. Treasuries of a
similar term. When deciding if securitization is a feasible
alternative, developers must therefore compare the like-term
Treasury plus the securitization costs, to a bullet loan of
the same duration.
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The commercial paper for 75 State Street was based on a ten
year term. Over the past six years the spread of 10-year
bullet loans over 10-year Treasuries has been extremely
volatile, sometimes changing as much as 150 basis points in a
single year. (See Exhibit 5.1; Spread of 10-Year Bullet Loans
Over 10-Year Treasuries).
Exhibit 5.1
Spread of 10-Year Bullet Loans Over 10-Year Treasuries
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Source; Barron's, Goldman Sach's & Co..
At the time of the financing (1986), the spread of 10-year
bullet loans over 10-year Treasuries was approximately 230
basis points. This gave the developers a significant spread
to cover the 120 basis points in fees, plus the spread of the
Federal Funds 30-day Composite Index for dealer paper over the
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Treasury bill, approximately 70 basis points. However, since
mid-1987, the spread of 10-year bullet loans over 10-year
Treasuries has remained relatively stable, ranging from 120 to
130 basis points. This is the primary reason why we have not
seen more commercial paper issues on to-be-developed projects.
Developers continue to see securitization as an alternative
but are finding bullet loans and participating-type mortgages
to be significantly less expensive in today's market. (4)
The costs that are involved in securitization is a major
detriment to its use. The largest of the these costs is the
credit enhancement that is needed on most new developments.
The success and pricing of a real estate security depends upon
the credit rating that the property receives. Credit agencies
that have typically rated corporate bonds, such as Standard &
Poor's Corporation, Moody's Investors Services and Duff &
Phelps, have adapted their requirements for such ratings to
real estate. (See Appendix C for the minimum requirements
needed for Standard & Poor's credit ratings, and a definition
of these ratings). Due to the stringent requirements,
developers have to turn to third party credit enhancement to
obtain an investment grade rating. The developers of 75 State
Street used Citibank as the third party guarantor for a fee of
approximately 100 basis points or $ 2.9 million. The
securitization of 1201 Third Avenue used a letter of credit
from Deutsche Bank AG to guarantee their commercial paper
issue of $120 million.
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The fees for third party credit enhancement significantly
increases the cost of securitization of to-be-developed
properties compared to seasoned properties. The Beacon
Companies were able to obtain a AA rating on Center Plaza, a
fully leased Boston office building, without any third party
credit support. They were able to obtain financing at 9.1%,
approximately 40 basis points less than 75 State Street, with
10-year Treasuries being 10 basis points higher (7.3%) at the
time of the issue.
If developers can avoid using third-party guarantees,
securitization is much more attractive. The IBM Somers Office
Complex in Westchester County, New York, is an example of
this. The 1.1 million square foot development will
headquarter the five operating units of IBM United States.
The property is a joint venture between IBM, The Shorenstein
Company and Bechtel Investments Inc. and will be leased to IBM
for a term beyond the term of the debt. The $206 million
worth of twelve year notes were rated AAA by Standard & Poor's
and Aaa by Moody's Investor Service due to the quality of the
tenant. This financing was the first mortgage transaction
ever to receive the highest possible credit rating from both
of these agencies. (5) Unfortunately, most developments are
not pre-leased to such blue-chip companies as IBM.
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The cost of credit enhancement can range anywhere from 50-200
basis points depending on the level of risk in the development
that is perceived by the sponsor. (6) Even though 75 State
Street was speculative, with zero pre-leasing, it was
perceived by Citibank to be a relatively low risk deal for the
following reasons;
A) The Boston office market was among the strongest in
the nation. The lack of pre-leasing was by design.
The developers did not want to sign a below market
lease with an anchor tenant just to obtain
financing.
B) 75 State Street was considered to be the prime
location within Boston's financial district.
C) The quality of the building was considered to give
75 State Street the most prestigious address in
Boston.
D) The quality and size of the developers, Beacon and
Equitable, gave further assurances that a successful
project would be developed and that a default was
not likely.
Without the above conditions, the commercial paper program on
an unleased, to-be-built office building, may not have yielded
such low financing costs without additional credit enhancement
or guarantees from the developers.
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As the cost of development continues to increase, many owners
believe that securitization is the only way to avoid
monopolistic pricing of their debt. As the size of a deal
increases, the number of capital sources willing to finance
the required amount decreases rapidly. When dealing with
large scale developments such as 75 State Street, there are
very few sources of capital willing to finance $300 million
worth of debt. This results in the complexity and
inefficiency of dealing with several lenders or suffering the
monopolistic power of dealing with the few institutions
capable of financing the entire amount. This fundamental
problem was a primary factor in the decision to securitize the
development of 75 State Street. (7)
Securitization provides access to a broader range of financing
sources and therefore can give the developer lower borrowing
costs. By accessing the capital markets directly, borrowers
have been able to achieve all-in financing costs in the
neighborhood of 50 basis points lower than conventional
financing. (8) On a $100 million loan, this could equate to a
savings of $500,000 annually and $5 million over the life of a
ten year loan.
However, many developers believe that not having a single
lender to deal with is a major disadvantage to securitization
and one of the primary reasons why the vehicle has not been
more popular with to-be-developed projects. (9) One of the
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traditional advantages to using non-securitized financing
supplied by a large institution, is the purported long-term
flexibility that often develops through the course of the
relationship. The institutions, or their advisors, are
usually experts at evaluating the returns, appreciation
potential, non-systematic risks, and the development
possibilities that are often unique to a particular project.
If the institutions that are supplying the capital have enough
of a time horizon, and they share in the developer's vision of
the project's potential, they often exhibit the flexibility to
change rates, terms, restructure the debt, or supply
additional capital to a troubled property. (10)
In contrast, the markets for securitized debt and equity are
relatively impersonal, as are the agencies who rate the
securities. When a securitized project gets in trouble there
is not the flexibility and understanding to restructure the
debt as in traditional financing. If the developer tries a
second issue to raise additional capital, or a restructuring
of the existing issue, it signals a troubled venture to an
investment community that does not understand the market
conditions. This negative signal will greatly increase the
cost of the capital infusion, at precisely the time when the
developer needs relief.
The securitization of 75 State Street was successful due to
the nature of the capital markets at the time, particularly
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the high cost of conventional loans in relation to Treasuries.
Until we return to the large spreads encountered in 1982 and
1986, the high costs involved will prevent securitization from
being a financially feasible alternative for to-be-developed
projects. However, developers must weigh the costs involved,
and the disadvantages discussed above, against the relative
advantages securitization provides.
Securitization offers superior flexibility as to the timing,
overall amount, and prepayment of the financing. The timing
of an issue can be done all at once for permanent financing or
it can be staged over time to match a construction draw
schedule. The total amount can range anywhere from $25
million to over $1 billion, greatly exceeding the capacity of
any institutional lender. Furthermore, the financing is
non-recourse to the borrower and can be prepaid at costs
significantly less than the typical yield maintenance
penalties that are imposed on conventional loans.
The true test for the securitization of real estate will come
when existing securitized projects need to be refinanced.
While there has been much focus on the default risk of
securitization (the lack of annual cash flows to pay the debt
service), Wall Street faces the more severe problem of the
refinancing risk. (11) Similar to junk bonds, securitization
is too recent of a financing tool to have seen it go full
cycle.
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The future costs of securitization will depend on how well the
rating agencies have assessed the risk and how many third
party sources have to fund their guarantees. -The future of
securitization on to-be-developed properties depends on not
what the capital markets look like today but rather what they
will look like ten years from now. As we have seen in the
1980's, the real estate capital market will continue to adapt
to the changing financial markets and the risk profiles of the
investment community.
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CHAPTER VI.
CONCLUSION
The securitization of to-be-developed properties has produced
successful financings, as evidenced by 75 State Street.
Securitization can provide developers with a great deal more
flexibility than would be obtained through conventional
financing. However, the past success of commercial paper
programs was the result of the state of the capital markets at
the time, rather than the innovation of securitization as a
financing vehicle. The quality of the Boston office market,
the development team, and the large spread that existed
between conventional financing and Treasuries, all contributed
to the success of 75 State Street. Without these factors in
place, alternate financing vehicles would have proved more
financially feasible.
As office markets around the country continue to be overbuilt,
securitization of to-be-developed properties will not be
feasible. Due the high degree of speculation inherent in
these developments, third-party credit enhancement will
continue to be cost prohibitive, as lenders are now
recognizing the potential of default when the refinancing of
securitized properties begins to occur.
Securitization will continue to be attractive if developers
can avoid the costly process of third-party credit
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enhancement. However, credit enhancement will continue to be
necessary in the absence of pre-leasing to high quality,
blue-chip tenants.
If we return to the large spreads between conventional
financing and Treasuries that existed in 1982 and 1986, then
securitization of to-be-developed properties may once again be
financially feasible. Until that occurs, we will see the
continuing use of institutional partnerships and
participating-type mortgages as the primary financing vehicles
under today's capital market structure.
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APPENDIX A.
PARTICIPATING AND CONVERTIBLE MORTGAGES
Participating Mortgage
The participating mortgage is currently the most widely used
debt instrument for permanent financing on to-be-developed
projects. In a typical participating mortgage, the lender
funds the loan at a below market rate and in return receives a
participation interest in the project's cash flows. The
vehicle was first designed prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986
for financing involving taxable and non-taxable entities. In
this scenario, the non-taxable lender (pension fund) would
receive the cash flows from the project while the developer
would retain sole equity ownership and therefore all of the
tax benefits associated with real estate. Since Tax Reform,
this is no longer as great an issue. However, the
participating mortgage still remains the primary financial
structure to share and/or separate the risks and rewards
between the lender and borrower.
The advisory company of Aldrich, Eastman & Waltch was one of
the early pioneers in the participating mortgage market and it
is still their primary investment vehicle. The reason is that
the majority of pension money is interested in an equity
position (rather than a fixed-rate mortgage) to act as a hedge
against inflation and/or to boost their yields. Historically,
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participating mortgages have yielded higher returns than fixed
rate mortgages but since the coupon rate is lower, the higher
yield represents a greater risk than a fixed-rate yield. (1)
The participating mortgage is essentially an equity position
disguised as debt. The mortgage provides protection for their
capital and a minimum return, yet it helps the development
through use of leverage and tax benefits. The lender gets the
upside potential with little downside risk. The participating
mortgage is also used to separate the cash flows from the back
end of the deal. Thus lenders use it as an incentive tool for
the developer/partner to deliver a profitable project.
The developer usually does not mind giving away some of the
upside potential because of the benefits that the
participating mortgage provides. The coupon rate on the
mortgage is usually below that of a fixed-rate mortgage. This
helps the projects cash flows in the early years and
mitigates the risk of default. The average coupon rate on a
participating mortgage today is between 8% and 9% with the
lender averaging an overall yield of approximately 12% with
the participation. (2) Fixed-rate mortgages today are
currently averaging 10%.
Participating mortgages typically give the developer a larger
amount of financing than fixed-rate mortgages. Primarily
because the lower coupon rate allows a larger principal amount
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with the same debt service coverage ratio. 90% financing can
be achieved with participating mortgages and sometimes even
higher. The high leverage, low coupon rate, and retention of
all the tax benefits, enable the development to be better
capitalized with a lower debt service and less risk of cash
calls or default.
Convertible Mortgage
The features of the convertible mortgage act in much the same
way as the participating mortgage. Similar to a participating
mortgage, the instrument is essentially equity disguised as
debt because it gives the lender the right to convert their
debt into equity at certain specified time periods. Again,
this gives the lender the upside potential of having a higher
return while protecting the downside with a base coupon rate
and a senior position on the property. The developer gets a
below market coupon rate but unlike the participating
mortgage, gets to keep all of the cash flows (if there are
any) until the lender converts the option. For this reason it
is in the developers best interest to negotiate the longest
possible time before the lender can convert.
The convertible mortgage is an option on the future cash flows
and residual sale proceeds of the project. The premium that
the lender pays for this option is a lower coupon rate and a
higher principal amount. However, they reduce their exposure
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by having a first position mortgage with a base rate and the
right to convert if the project appreciates enough to exceed
inflation. The developer reduces the risk of deficits in the
short term through the lower interest rate and higher loan
amount but pays for it by granting an option on a portion (a
negotiable percentage) of the developments appreciation.
Convertible mortgages can be combined with a participating
structure to give the lender both a share in the projects cash
flows as well as the right to convert. Exhibit A-1 compares
participating and participating/convertible loan structures to
conventional financing for a recent financing on a 1.5
million square foot regional mall. The mall had annual free
and clear cash flow of $6.5 million which yielded a value of
$100 million when capped at 6.5%.
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Exhibit A-1
Comparative Loan Terms For Conventional,
Participating and Participating/Convertible Structures
Proceeds Raised
Initial Pay Rate
Participation
Conventional
$59 million
10.50%
N/A
Participating
$75 million
8.25%
40% of cash
flow excess
of base debt
service.
40% of appre-
ciation at
maturity.
Participate/
Convertible
$85 million
6% (yrs.1-2)
8% (yrs.3-5)
9% (yr.6-15)
60% of cash
flow excess
of base debt
service.60%
of apprecia-
tion until
11% yield is
earned & 50%
thereafter.
Minimum Yield
Estimated Yield
Maturity Period
Initial DCR
Range Of DCR
Range Of LTV
10.75%
10.75%
10 yrs.
1.05
1.05-1.62
59-36%
DCR; Debt Service Coverage Ratio
LTV; Loan To Value Ratio
Source; Goldman Sachs & Co.
8.25%
11.10%
15 yrs.
1.05
1.05-2.08
75-57%
8.12%
11.30%
15 yrs.
1.27
1.05-1.68
85-71%
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APPENDIX B
ACCRUAL MORTGAGES
The Accrual Mortgage
The accrual mortgage is another financing structure that has
evolved out of the current, high interest rate environment.
Under the accrual mortgage, the schedule of pay rates slowly
graduate until they meet a specified coupon rate. The accrued
interest needed to meet the lender's yield requirement is paid
at maturity. A variation of this structure is the Deep
Discount Mortgage, where the pay rate remains fixed over the
life of the loan and is well below the coupon rate. Under
this structure all of the accrued interest is paid at
maturity.
Both the accrual mortgage and the deep discount mortgage are
useful to developers in that they provide a payment schedule
that more closely matches the project's cash flows and
appreciation. The two structures also typically provide
higher loan amounts than conventional financing, although they
are usually below what a participating-type structure would
provide. Lender's like accrual mortgages because they provide
a higher coupon rate over the life of the mortgage. However,
they are not as desirable as participating mortgages because
they do not offer a hedge against inflation. Exhibit B-1
compares the accrual and deep discount loan structures to
conventional financing for the $100 million regional mall used
in Exhibit A-1.
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Exhibit B-1
Comparative Loan Terms For Conventional,
Deep Discount, and Accrual Structures
Proceeds Raised
Coupon Rate
Initial Pay Rate
Conventional
$59 million
10.50%
10.50%
Deep Discount
$64 million
11.00%
9.25%
Accrual
$73 million
10.75%
8.00%
Increase In Pay Rate
Initial DCR
Maturity Period
N/A
1.05
10 yrs.
N/A
1.10
7 yrs.
50 basis
points every
2 years.
1.11
15 yrs.
Range In DCR
Range In LTV
1.05-1.62
59-36%
1.10-1.47
64-53%
1.09-1.37
73-42%
Source; Goldman Sachs & Co.
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APPENDIX C
Minimum Requirements For Standard & Poor's Credit Ratings
bles 'B' _'88' 888' 'AA
Debt service coverage Minimum 1.05 x at Minimum 1.1 x at Minimum 1.15 x at Minimum 1.2 x at
ratioai origination origination origination origination
Loan-to-value ratioW Maximum 900 3 at
origination
Seasoning Minimum 3 yrs.
Property type Office building
Property size tonly 50.000 sq. ft.
applicable to office
buildings)
Maximum 8500 at
origination
Minimum 3 yrs.
Office building
50.000 sq. ft.
Maximum 80% at Maximum 75%'o at
origination origination
Minimum 3 yrs. Minimum 3 yrs.
Office building - Office builidng
50.000 sq. ft. 50,000 sq. ft.
Loan terms Fully amortizing. Fully amortizing. Fully amortizing. Fully amortizing,
level pay level pay level pay level pay
Seasoned mortgage No late payments in No late payments in No late payments in No late payments in
late payment history preceding year no preceding year no preceding year no preceding year no
more than 2 in the 3 more than 2 in the 3 more than 2 in the 3 more than 2 in the 3
years prior to submis- years prior to submis- years prior to submis- years prior to submis-
sion to pool sion to pool sion to pool sion to pool
Needed credit support
Minimum 1.2 x at
origination
Maximum 75% at
origination
Minimum 3 yrs.
Office building
50.000 sq. ft.
Fully amortizing,
level pay
No late payments in
preceding year no
more than 2 in the 3
years pror to submis-
sion to pool
Add 25% to reserve
needed for 'A' pool
(a) Debt service coverage ratio is calculated as effective
gross revenues minus operating expenses before taxes
divided by total debt service charges.
(b) Loan to value ratio is the amount of the mortgage
outstanding divided by the value of the property.
Source; Standard & Poor's, Real Estate Finance Journal.
Definition of Ratings
Category
Highest credit quality. The risk factors are only
slightly more than for risk-free U.S. Treasury
debt.
High credit quality. Protection factors are strong.
Risk is modest but may vary slightly from time to
time due to of economic conditions.
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Varia
Rating
AAA
AA
A Good quality investment grade securities.
Protection factors are average but adequate.
However, risk factors are more variable and greater
in periods of economic stress.
BBB Below average protection factors but still
considered sufficient for institutional investment.
Considerable variability in risk during economic
cycles.
BB Below investment grade but deemed likely to meet
obligations when due. Protection factors fluctuate
according to economic conditions. Overall quality
may move up or down frequently within this category.
B Below investment grade and possessing risk that
obligations will not be met when due. Protection
factors will fluctuate widely according to economic
cycles. Potential exists for frequent changes in
quality rating within this category or into a higher
or lower quality rating grade.
Source; Real Estate Finance Journal.
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